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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Pla in t i f f -Appel lan t , Ri ta L. Pate (hereinaf ter re fe r red to as " p l a i n t i f f " ) , 
brought act ion in negligence against defendants Marathon Steel Company, an Arizona 
corporation (hereinaf ter re fe r red to as Marathon), Hensel-Phelps Company, a 
Colorado corporation (here inaf ter re fer red to as Hensel-Phelps), and Erico Products-
I n c , an Ohio corporation (hereinaf ter re fer red to as Er ico) . P l a i n t i f f , an 
employee of P lacers , I n c . , a second t i e r subcontractor, sued Marathon, a f i r s t 
t i e r subcontractor, and Hensel-Phelps, the general contrac tor , for damages caused 
by said defendants negligent construction and maintenance of a platform "hole" 
upon which plamtiff was required to work. Defendant Hensel-Phelps constructed 
the walls of the "hole" using smooth, oiled metal forms. (R. 377-378). Ply-
wood sheets were placed by others over re-bars to form a floor. (R. 343) This 
resulted in a ?rholeM with slick walls of approximately six to eight feet in 
height with no means of rapid exit from the platform being provided for a person 
such as the plaintiff. The plaintiff was severely burned when a fire occurred 
in the platform fTholef! and she was unable to escape in time to avoid harm. 
Plaintiff sued Marathon and Erico on products liability for manufacture, dis-
tribution and sale of an unsafe and/or defective cadwelder unit used to fuse 
reinforcing steel bars together. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Cfri November 19, 1982, the lower court dismissed the plaintiff's cause of 
action on a Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Hensel-Phelps and 
Marathon on negligence. The Court denied Motion for Sunmary Judgment as to 
Marathon and Erico as to products liability. The plaintiff moved for recon-
sideration of the dismissal as to Hensel-Phelps and Marathon, with said Motion 
being heard December 9, 1982. The lower Court reaffirmed its previous Order 
on February 19, 1983, on two grounds: (1) that Hensel-Phelps and Marathon x^ ere 
entitled to Sunmary Judgment because no material issues of fact were in dispute 
between the plaintiff and such parties, and (2) because said defendants were 
"fellow servants" of the plaintiff and her suit was barred by the Utah Workmens 
Compensation Act. On May 29, 1984, plaintiff moved the Court for a ruling of 
final judgment as to its dismissal of Hensel-Phelps and Marathon pursuant to 
Rule 54(b) U.R.C.P. This was denied by Order dated August 15, 1984. Plaintiff 
filed a petition for extraordinary relief in the form of certiorari with this 
this Court seeking a reversal of the Trial Court's refusal to issue a final 
judgment under Rule 54(b) U.R.C.P. This Court issued a green sheet decision 
November 9, 1984 holding the trial court: could make its summary judgment dismissal 
final under Rule 54(b) U.R.C.P. Plaintiff moved the trial court for issuance of 
an Order making its sunmary judgment dismissal final under said Rule on December 
13, 1984. The trial court issued its final judgment as to its sunmary judgnent 
dismissal of Hensel-Phelps and Marathon on January 8, 1985. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a ranand of the case to the Third Judicial District Court 
of Utah for a trial on the merits on the grounds that the lower court committed 
reversible error in granting the Motions for Sunmary Judgment as to the dismissal 
of Hensel-Phelps and Marathon. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff sued defendants Hensel-Phelps and Marathon for negligent con-
struction and maintenance of a platform tfhole". (R.4). The walls of smooth, 
oiled metal forms were to be used by Hensel-Phelps in forming and pouring concrete. 
(R. 377). Employees of Placers, Inc. placed plywood to create a floor. (R. 343). 
Marathon, a subcontractor of Hensel-Phelps, furnished and erected steel 
reinforcing bars. Placers, Inc., the employer of the plaintiff, subcontracted 
with Marathon to fuse reinforcing bars together. Hensel-Phelps, the general con-
tractor, poured the concrete. The portion of the project being worked on by 
plaintiff at the time of her injury was construction of a bridge over Highway 
1-15 in Sevier County at the Cove Fort Canyon overpass. 
The plaintiff also sued Marathon and Erico claiming that the cadwelding 
unit, which was used to fuse the reinforcing bars together and which caused the 
fire and explosion,was defective in its design and/or construction. (R. 4). 
She did not sue Placers, Inc. 
All defendants made Motions for Sunmary Judgment against the plaintiff 
which were heard before the Honorable Philip R. Fishier on November 3, 1982. 
(R. 245). 
By Order dated November 19, 1982, (R. 270) the Court granted the Motions 
for Sunmary Judgment of defendants Hensel-Phelps and Marathon with respect to 
the negligent construction and maintenance of the platform fTholen. The Court 
determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact between the plain-
tiff and said defendants. The Court furthermore ruled that said defendants were 
entitled to sunmary judgment on the sole basis of the fellow-servant doctrine 
of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. The Court denied Motions for Summary 
Judgment made by Erico and Marathon with respect to products liability arising 
out of the defective construction and/or design of the cadwelding unit concerned. 
The plaintiff moved for reconsideration, the same being heard December 9, 
1982. From the bench, the Judge Issued the same Order as before, i.e., upholding 
sunmary judgment in favor of Hensel-Phelps and Marathon and denying the MDtions 
as to Erico and Marathon. (R. 279). The Order arising out of the rehearing of 
the aforesaid Motions was signed and filed by the Court on February 10, 1983. 
This specifically stated the dismissal was based upon the "fellow servant1! 
doctrine, i.e., at the time of her injury plaintiff was an employee of Hensel-
Phelps and Marathon. 
Plaintiff began work for Placers, Inc. on or about June 13, 1980. (PI. 
dep. 19). On June 24, and for approximately one-half of a day on June 25, 1980, 
the plaintiff had assisted a Placers, Inc. journeyman iron worker, Mr. Mel Smith, 
in operating a cadwelding unit (pi. dep. 63) at a location other than where her 
injury occurred. (PI. dep. 34.) 
The plaintiff had no training as an iron worker prior to said employment 
and had little or none during said employment. (PI. dep. 20, 26.) She had no 
previous heavy construction work background and, in particular, she had no 
experience in the operation of a cadwelding unit other than on June 24 and 25. 
(PI. dep. 115). She operated under the sole direction and control of the journey-
man she was assigned to assist and she did what he told her to do. (PI. dep. 35). 
On June 25, 1980 in the afternoon, the plaintiff was directed to get down 
into the platform fTholefr where she was to assist Mr. Mel Smith in operating the 
cadwelding unit. The tfholeu consisted of plywood placed across reinforcing bars 
to make a floor. The floor was surrounded on all sides by walls consisting of 
metal forming sections approximately 6 to 8 feet in height. Thus the lfholeff had 
slick, oiled metal sides facing inwards. The walls had been erected by defendant 
Hensel-Phelps to pour its concrete after the re-bar work in that area was complete. 
(PI. dep. 160, 161). 
When the plaintiff was first directed to get down into the platform ffholef?, 
she refused to do so indicating that there was no way that she could get up out 
of that f,Holefl other than to shinny up the rods. She said she was afraid that 
she could not do this. (PI. dep. 72, 73, 136.) 
The plaintiff is a somewhat obese young woman of 22 years of age approxi-
mately 5 feet 3 inches in height. She lacked upper body strength leading Mel 
Smith to say, f,she could not lift a box of powder over her head.11 (R. 342). 
Defendant Hensel-Phelps, the general contractor, failed, in conjunction 
with creating and maintaining the slick platform walls, to place or have placed 
in its capacity as general superintendent of safety any ladder (pi. dep. 74) in 
the ffhole" or other means to provide for a rapid exit therefrom for a person 
such as plaintiff. For the plaintiff, this was particularly significant in view 
of her lack of strength. (PI. dep. 136). Someone exiting from the ,Tholeft was 
thus forced by necessity to climb hand over hand up the vertical reinforcing 
bars while pushing against slick metal walls with their feet. (PI. dep- 161). 
When the plaintiff at first refused to get down into the fThole,! to assist 
Mr. Smith, she did so because she was afraid she could not climb out using the 
rods and walls. She and Smith were alone in said Trhole. She was told by fellow 
Placers employees they would find a way to get her out. Afraid of losing her job 
if she refused, she got down into the 1fhole" to assist Mr. Smith. (PI. den. 72). 
At approximately 1:15 p.m. in the afternoon of June 25, 1980, Mr. Smith, 
with the plaintiff assisting as an apprentice, performed one fusion of two rein-
forcing bars while working in the ffholeff. (P. dep. 66). He then attempted to 
fuse a second set of two bars by fitting the cadwelder unit's sleeve over the 
joint of the bars and loading its crucible with a bag of substance which, when 
heated to a sufficient degree, turned into molten metal fusing the bars together. 
He also poured into the crucible the contents of one package of starting powder 
with a small portion of such powder being placed on the lip of the unit. The 
crucible concerned, therefore, had a full load of fusing material and a full 
packet of starter powder in it except for the small portion on the "lip". Mr. 
Smith tried to ignite the starting powder but failed. Mr. Smith then asked the 
plaintiff for a second small packet of starter powder. When she handed it to 
him, he put one-half of the contents of the starter powder packet in the crucible, 
which made one and one-half packets of such powder in the crucible, as well as 
the load of fusing material and he again placed sane starter powder on the lip 
for firing purposes. (PI. dep. p. 74-75, 76-82). (R. 349, 350). 
When this was completed, Mr, Smith fired the starter again. A loud noise 
and the expulsion of a great deal of smoke resulted. Mr. Smith said in his 
deposition that he imnediately saw a piece of hot molten material as big as a 
quarter fly out of the cadwelding unit and land on a bag of fusing powder near 
his feet. The plaintiff had her back to the cadwelding unit to avoid the smoke. 
(PI. dep. 75). 
Mr. Smith said that when he saw this he immediately jumped to the reinforc-
ing radius bars and climbed hand over hand up the bars and out over the top of 
the walls. He said that he moved out so fast that he got up to the top and 
when he turned around he saw that the plaintiff was still in the "hole". 
(R. 359-362). The plaintiff said that with her back turned her first warning 
of danger was x>*ien she heard Mr. Snith yell. She turned around to see molten 
metal coming out of the cadwelder unit from the top and the bottom, and hitting 
the platform and bouncing towards the corner of the platform floor where several 
packages of fusing material and starting powder had been stored, (pi. dep. 75, 
84, 85, 154-156). 
The plaintiff stated that she then ran to the radius bars that Mr. Smith 
had used and she "grabbed" hold of than. She planted her feet on the slick 
walls of the lrhole" and tried to pull herself up the side of the platform by 
pulling with her arms on the bars and pushing against the walls with her feet. 
Her feet slipped off the oiled surface of the forms dropping her twice back to 
the floor of the platform. (PI. dep. 161). She tried a third time and proceeded 
as fast as she possibly could to climb up the walls of the "hole". She stated 
that she felt one blast of heat near the floor and when she was about to the 
top she was struck *by a much bigger blast of heat setting her clothes on fire. 
(PI. dep. 123, 124, 118-120). (R. 364). She also said that she thought, if a 
ladder had been provided, she could have gotten out of the "hole" fast enough to 
keep herself from being burned. (PI. dep. 156). 
The plaintiff suffered second degree burns over 32.3% of her body with 19% 
of those burns being of third degree severity. The burn areas covered her thighs, 
buttocks, back and one side. (PI. dep. 93, 94). 
The plaintiff's deposition states that molten material came out of the cad-
welding unit from the top and from the bottom and literally bounced across the 
frhole" floor to the place where several bags of flosing and starter material were 
stored in the corner. (PI. dep. 70, 155). Mr. Smith testified that the fire 
was caused by a large spark as big as a quarter in diameter that flew out of the 
cadwelding unit, even though he was holding a lit on the unit, and this spark 
ignited a bag of fusing material that had been placed near his feet by the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff stated she was burned by the bags of powder igniting 
in the corner of the fThole,f. Mr. Smith contended she was burned by the single 
bag igniting near his feet. 
The cadwelding unit was sold to Placers, Inc. by Marathon. Marathon pur-
chased the unit from Erico. Plaintiff claims the cadwelding unit was improperly 
designed or constructed. (PI. dep. 148, 116, 90). At the time of the accident 
there were no employees of Hensel-Phelps or Marathon in the platform or the 
ITholen. No employees of said defendants were working in the TTioleff in conjunc-
tion with the plaintiff or in the same, similar or related work at the time of 
the injury. No employees of said defendants, at the time of the injury, were 
involved in co-work with the plaintiff. (PI. dep. 68) Placers, Inc. is an inde-
pendant contractor and at the time concerned herein plaintiff was not under the 
control or direction of personnel of Hensel-Phelps or Marathon. 
The latter two firms did not have the right to control the processes and 
work procedures of Placers, Inc. at the time of plaintiff's injuries. Placers, 
Inc. performed its work as it saw fit meeting specification requirements. No 
facts show Hensel-Phelps or Marathon were the employers of plaintiff within the 
meaning of 35-1-62, UCA, as amended in 1975. 
Mr. Smith stated that after he got to the top of the fthole", he looked 
back and saw that the plaintiff had climbed up to within the last few feet of 
the top of the wall. He said he reached back to help the plaintiff. This state-
ment factually varies with another portion of Mr. Smith's deposition. (R.364-365) 
Mr. Smith suffered burns on 10% of his body. It is the plaintiff's contention 
that he suffered those burns after he was out of the frholeM and leaned back to 
help the plaintiff up the last few feet and that was when the major blast 
occurred. Mr. Smith stated in his deposition that he was burned before he got 
out of the "hole11 even though he states that after he got out of the ftholefl he 
turned and looked back and saw the plaintiff still in the fholeM. (Pl.dep. 90,91) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN GRANTING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION OF 
DEFENDANTS HENSEL-PHELPS COMPANY AND MARATHON 
STEEL COMPANY BECAUSE MATERIAL FACTS ARE 
DISPUTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
At the ou t se t , i t should be observed tha t the mere existence of issues 
as to whether or not p l a i n t i f f , an employee of P lace rs , I n c . , was a lso an em-
ployee of Hensel-Phelps and Marathon a t the time of her in ju r ies in the speci f ic 
performance of her work precludes Sumnary Judgment in and of i t s e l f - In the 
case a t hand, no evidence ex i s t s to show Hensel-Phelps and/or Marathon had an 
employer r i g h t of control over the p l a i n t i f f . The record, in f ac t , proves 
otherwise* Hinds v . Herm Hughes Sons, I n c . , 577 P.2d 561 (Utah 1978) and Shupe 
v . Wasatch E l ec t r i c Company, I n c . , 546 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976). 
At tent ion i s inv i ted to Fonseca v . Pac i f ic Construction Co., L td . , 513 
P.2d 156 (Hawaii, 1973). This case i s probative because the Court there had to 
consider whether or not the decedent who worked for a subcontractor was in an 
employee-employer r e la t ionsh ip with the general contrac tor . The Court found 
he was not and reversed the T r i a l Court fs dismissal of the Complaint. 
The p l a i n t i f f claims tha t Hensel-Phelps constructed and maintained the 
s l i c k , smooth wal ls of the ! thole" for the purpose of pouring concrete. I t knew 
or should have known such f ,hole ! l would be or was being used by Placers for 
fusing r e -ba r s . I t created and maintained a , rhole , f with no way of rapid egress 
by someone such as p l a i n t i f f . The same appl ies to Marathon which, as a sub-
contractor of Hensel-Phelps, a l so used and maintained the fTholeff for i t s purposes. 
Hensel-Phelps was negl igent in u t i l i z i n g s l i c k , o i l ed metal forms c rea t -
ing wal ls of a frhole!t out of which i t knew or should have known tha t someone 
like the plaintiff would have to climb in an emergency by pushing against same. 
Hensel-Phelps knew or should have known that very rapid exit from this fTholen by 
such person would be impossible. In fact, the emergency occurred and the plain-
tiff, who lacked the necessary upper body strength, could not climb the walls 
quickly enough to escape grievous; harm. Mr. Smith could but she coundn't. 
It is considered that a ladder placed in the frholeff would have saved 
enough exit time, i.e., 4 or 5 seconds at the least, to have enabled the plain-
tiff to have gotten completely out of the ffholen before the second blast of heat 
struck, thus entirely avoiding or at the very least greatly mitigating her 
injuries. 
Material disputes of fact exist. This includes but is not limited to 
the number of heat blasts and their source; how the bags of starter and fusing 
material ignited; could plaintiff have exited quickly enough to escape harm 
had a ladder been provided; where were materials placed in the ,!holeff that ignited 
and could and should some other means of rapid egress have been provided. 
The plaintiff asserts that the Statement of Facts makes out a prima facia 
case of negligence against defendants Hensel-Phelps and Marathon which built and 
maintained the !rhole,f and which had over-all safety responsibilities and duties. 
In addition to the existence of disputed issues of fact, of course, the question 
of the employee-employer relationship between plaintiff and defendants militates 
against Summary Judgment. 
In this vein, the Utah Supreme Court case of Peterson v. Fowler. (1972) 
27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P.2d 997; (1973) 29 Utah 2d 366, 510 P.2d 523, seems con-
trolling. There a decedent's heirs brought suit against several subcontractors, 
T^IO were mutually engaged in performing various itons of work in the construc-
tion of the University of Utah Special Events Center. The decedent who worked 
for the general contractor or a subcontractor fell to his death when a bolt that 
had been installed in the ceiling by another contractor broke. The Trial Court 
issued summary judgment in favor of the defendants and against the decedent. 
The heirs of the decedent appealed and the opinion of this Court stated as 
follows: 
!IA surrmary judgment should be given when there is no material 
issue of fact in dispute and a party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Under the undisputed facts of this case 
we can see no negligence on the part of Timbers Structures, Inc. 
or of Savage Scaffold and Equipment Company, Inc. and the sum-
mary judgment in their favor should be and it is hereby sus-
tained. There are unresolved questions of negligence on the 
part of Skyclimber, Inc. and of contributory negligence or 
assumption of risk on the part of the deceased, which matters 
should be determined at trial." 
It should be noted in the Peterson case cited above that its facts are 
in many respects very similar to those in the case at hand. There, Skyclimber, 
Inc. had manufactured a square platform which could be raised and lowered by 
means of wires placed through eyebolts in the dome of the Special Events Center. 
Skyclimber, Inc., directed that wire cables were to be placed through eyebolts 
and extended laterally to the walls of the arena to support the platform. There 
was no particular extra stress on the bolts while the work was being done near 
the wall but as the scaffold was moved toward the center of the dome, the 
lateral stress increased. The result was that when the workers were near the 
center of the dome one of the eyebolts broke causing the men who were upon it 
to fall to their deaths. Under such facts the Utah Supreme Court held that a 
Summary Judgment in favor of Skyclimber, Inc. would be improper because there 
were obvious unresolved questions of negligence in the construction and main-
tenance of the platform on the part of such party and of contributory negligence 
or assumption of risk on the part of the decedent. The Court said that in view 
of these unresolved issues of negligence, contributory negligence and/or assump-
tion of risk, no summary judgment should be granted and the matter should be 
determined by the trier of the fact. It is considered that the same types of 
issues in the construction and maintenance of a platform by defendants Hensel-
Phelps and/or Marathon exist sufficient to reverse the Summary Judgment granted. 
As with other extraordinary actions, a Motion for Summary Judgment should 
be viewed by the Court in its light most favorable to the plaintiff, i.e., in 
this case the party opposing same- If any material dispute of fact exists, a 
Summary Judgment is not appropriate. So, too, if potential facts may appear 
at trial or after full discovery and a jury could find for plaintiff thereon, 
sizimary disposition is improper. The plaintiff is not bound to have tried or 
proven all facts via pre-trial discovery. So, too, summary judgment should be 
reversed if plaintiff might recover on any theory suitable to the existing or 
potential facts. Western Pacific Transport Conpany v. Beehive State Agr. Coop, 
597 P.2d 854 (Utah 1979) and Bill Brown Realty, Inc., v. Abbott. 562 P.2d 238 
(Utah 1977). 
Attention is invited to the case of Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 
(Utah 1977). There the Court said: 
f,The Summary Judgment procedure has the desirable and salutary 
purpose of eliminating the time, trouble and expense of a trial 
when there are no issues of fact in dispute and the controversy 
can be resolved as a matter of law. Nevertheless, that should 
not be done on conjecture, but only when the matter is clear; 
and in case of doubt, the doubt should be resolved in allowing 
the challenged party the opportunity of at least attempting to 
prove his right to recover. For that reason the "submissions" 
should be looked at in the light favorable to her (plaintiff's) 
position; and unless the court is able to conclude that there is 
no dispute on material facts, which if resolved in her favor 
would entitle her to recover, the court should not summarily 
reject her claim and render judgment against her as a matter 
of law." 
The case of Mathis v. Swanson, 413 P.2d 662 (Wash. 1966) appears noteworthy. 
There the Complaint sounded in attractive nuisance. The trial court granted a 
Summary Judgment against the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Washington reversed 
losing the following language: 
flA Sunrriary Judgment cannot be granted if there is a dispute 
as to any issue of material fact . . . .Nor can a Summary 
Judgment be granted if the facts are not in dispute, but 
reasonable minds might differ as to liability.f! 
In Mathis the facts were not in dispute, but the Court concluded that 
reasonable minds might differ as to the interpretation of the facts and deriva-
tion of liability therefrom. Here defendants may argue that they had no duty 
as to the ,!holeM and they were not negligent. Clearly they did not provide any 
rapid means of escape for one such as the plaintiff. On the basis of this and 
other facts obtaining, inferred or which may be adduced a jury could find for 
plaintiff thus precluding summary judgment. Plaintiff herein is entitled to 
every reasonable inference that can be drawn in her favor. Thompson v. Ford 
Mbtor Co., 395 P.2d 62 (Utah, 1964). For the purposes of summary judgment facts 
asserted by plaintiff must be accepted as true and credibility is not an issue. 
SJmgleton v. Alexander, 431 P.2d 126 (Utah 1967). If under any set of facts that 
might properly be adduced and/or if under any theory of law or interpretation 
thereof plaintiff could recover summary judgment should be reversed. Kidman v. 
White, 378 P.2d 898 (Utah, 1963). 
The burden of proof of convincing this Court that material issues of fact 
do not exist is on the moving parties. It is submitted that the mere allegation 
by defendants that no material issues of fact exist is insufficient. See Ellerman 
v. Kite, 625 P.2d 1006 (Colo. 1981). There the Court ruled that an issue of scope 
of employment precluded sunmary judgment. The Court said: 
"Sunmary Judgment is a drastic remedy. It must never be 
granted except on a clear showing that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact. . . .All doubts as to the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be 
resolved against the moving party. . . .Anco has not carried 
its burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact bearing on whether Kite was acting within 
the scope of his employment by Anco when the pickup truck 
which he was driving struck the child." 
It should be understood that, in the case herein, as it now stands, the 
only basis for the contentions of the defendants and the conclusion of the 
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Trial Court as to Summary Judgment were predicated solely upon the pleadings 
and partial discovery. It is not the responsibility of the plaintiff in its 
pleadings for that matter, and certainly in depositions or answers to inter-
rogatories, to establish conclusive proof of her claim. When there are issues 
not raised but which can be envisioned and which are subject to being proven, 
a Summary Judgment is not proper. Wheeler v. Board of County Commissioners 
of San Juan County, 391 P.2d 664 (N.M. 1964). There the Court stated: 
flWe have held that in resolving the question as to whether Summary 
Judgment should be granted, the trial court does not waive the 
evidence nor do we; that the pleadings, affidavits, interrogatories 
and admissions, if any, must be viewed in the most favorable aspect 
they will bear in support of the rights of the party opposing the 
motion to a trial of the issues. « . . and party against whom a 
motion for Sumnary Judgment is directed is entitled to have all 
reasonable inferences construed in his favor. . . .We would place 
too strict a construction upon Rule 56 (c) . . .N.M.S.A, 1953 
Comp., if we sustain the Summary Judgment based upon Wheeler1 s 
answers to the interrogatories herein before set out. So long as 
the interrogatories and answers thereto do not constitute a danon-
stration of the invalidity of the plaintiff1 s claim, the mere 
inadequacy of the answers to the interrogatories to establish the 
claim has no persuasiveness in ruling on a motion for Summary 
Judgment, since there is no burden on the plaintiff to establish 
his case in a pretrial interrogatory or deposition.11 
If the pleadings and the depositions of the parties reflect differing 
interpretations of fact or disputes as to which facts exist, Sunmary Judgment 
should not be given. Litigants are entitled to the right of trial where there 
is the slightest doubt as to the facts. Furthermore, even if the basic facts 
are not in dispute where possible inferences or conclusions which could be drawn 
could be determined by a jury in favor of the plaintiff, sunmary judgment is not 
warranted. Executive Towers v. Leanard, 439 P.2d 303 (Ariz. 1968). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN GRANTING THE MOTION OF DEFEND-
ANTS HENSEL-PHELPS COMPANY AND MARATHON 
STEEL COMPANY FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 
THE BASIS OF THE FELLOW-SERVANT DOCTRINE 
OF THE UTAH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. 
The lower court, in granting Summary Judgment for defendants Hensel-Phelps 
and Marathon, based its decision solely upon the fellow-servant doctrine of Utah's 
Workmen's Compensation statute. (R.280) It should be noted that plaintiff, for 
this reason, did not instigate a cause of action against her employer Placers, 
Inc., a second tier subcontractor. However, such defense under the facts herein 
does not insulate the general contractor, Hensel-Phelps, and its subcontractor, 
Marathon, from their own negligence in constructing and/or maintaining the work 
platform which caused injuries to the plaintiff. 
The Workmen's Compensation statute was amended in 1975 to specifically 
provide redress to an injured party for injuries suffered on the job by reason 
of the negligence of another subcontractor or the general contractor. Attention 
is invited to § 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which in pertinent 
part reads as follows: 
"When any injury or death for which compensation is payable 
under this title shall have been caused by the wrongful act 
or neglect of a person other than an employer, officer, agent, 
or employee of said employer, the injured employee, or in case 
of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the injured 
employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have 
an action for damages against such third person . . . For the 
purposes of this Section and notwithstanding the provisions of 
§35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or person represen-
tative may also maintain an action for damages against subcon-
tractors, general contractors, independent contractors, property 
owners or their lessees or assigns, not occupying an employee-
gnployer relationship with the injured or deceased employee at 
the time of his injury or death."(Emphasis added.) 
This 1975 amendment was enacted, it is believed, to overturn rulings of 
this Court which had denied relief to an employee who was injured by the negli-
gence of another subcontractor or general contractor primarily because they were 
working on the same project albeit in different tasks and/or areas. Since the 
1975 amendment this Court has recognized this legislative intent and purpose 
in holding that of an employee of one subcontractor may sue another subcontractor 
(or the prime contractor) for negligence unless it is shown that the plaintiff 
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was in an employee-employer relationship with defendant. 
Attention is invited to Hinds v. Herm Hughes and Sons Inc., supra. There 
the Court cited the above provision of §35-1-62, UCA, as amended in 1975. The 
decision reversed a Sucnmary Judgment ruling against plaintiff and remanded the 
case for trial. The Court noted that the plaintiff could not be the employee 
of another subcontractor so that his suit would be barred unless such subcon-
tractor had the right to control the specific work done by the plaintiff at 
the time of injury. (Emphasis added.) The record in the case at hand discloses 
no credible evidence at all to show that Hensel-Phelps or Marathon had the right 
to control the work of the plaintiff at the time concerned. Placers, Inc., her 
employer, was an independent contractor and it alone controlled the manner, 
method and work procedures and processes of its own employees. Supervision and 
control of its own employees as to their specific tasks was the right of Placers 
and not Hensel-Phelps and Marathon • 
See also Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Company, Inc., supra. There this 
Court held the employee of the prime contractor could not sue a subcontractor 
under §35-1-62 prior to the 1975 amendment but could have done so thereafter. 
The facts were that the deceased employee was doing carpentry work for the 
general contractor at the site. He was electrocuted when an improperly insulated 
wire touched some forms he was using. The Court obviously concluded the plaintiff 
was not the employee of defendant even though they were working on the same 
project and in the same area. 
In order for the decision of the lower court to be upheld in granting 
Sunmary Judgment in favor of Hensel-Phelps and Marathon, it is essential they 
be found to be the employers of plaintiff with the control such relationship 
envisions. Fonseca v. Pacific Construction Co., Ltd., supra, is noteworthy 
because it found the decedent, a subcontractor's worker, was not in an employee-
employer relationship with the general contractor. It did so because the 
subcontractor carried its own compensation coverage. It further found there were 
no incidents of employee-employer relationships between plaintiff and defendant. 
This WDuld appear certainly to include rights of control. The Court said: 
"We, therefore, conclude that under Workmen's Compensation 
statutes, third party general contractors are not inmune 
to common law negligence actions on the part of employees 
of their subcontractors absent the incidence of a true 
employee-employer relationship.11 
It should be noted in the case herein Placers, the employer of Ms. Pate provided 
its own compensation insurance. 
In Peterson v. Fowler, supra, this Court traced the fellow-servant rule 
prior to the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act, stating: 
"Prior to the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act, an 
employee could not sue his employer for injuries resulting from 
a negligent act of a fellow-servant. In determining what con-
stituted fellow-servants, the courts were in practical uniform-
ity in holding that unless they were engaged in the same employ-
ment at the same time, they were not fellow-servants so as to 
prevent an action against their corrmon enployer. If they were 
employed in separate departments of the same enterprise, they 
were not considered fellow-servants unless their work was so 
related that they were likely to be in such proximity to one 
another that seme special risk could be anticipated toward one 
if the other were negligent." (27 Utah 2d at p.151, 493 P.2d 
at p. 999). 
In the second appeal of Peterson, the Court defined "same employment" as 
follows: 
"To be fellow servants, they must be engaged in the same line 
of work and labor together in such personal relations that 
they can exercise an influence upon each other promotive of 
proper caution in respect of their mutual safety. They should 
be at the time of the injury directly operating with each 
other in the particular business at hand, or they must be 
operating so that mutual duties bring thou into such co-associ-
ation that they may exercise an influence upon each other to 
use proper caution and be so situated in their labor to some 
extent as to be able to supervise and watch the conduct of 
each other as to skill, diligence, and carefulness, (Emphasis 
added.) (29 Utah 2d at p. 164, 510 P.2d at p. 525) 
Other Utah cases have indicated that before "same employment" can be found 
to exist facts must show the one alleged to be the "employer" must, vis a vis 
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the alleged "employee", pay wages, have the right to hire, fire and control 
work methods and details. See the following: 
Mthe method of payment, right to discharge, nature of work . . . 
right to control as to means and method of performance." Inter-
mountain Speedways v. Industrial Commission. 101 Utah 573, 
126 P.2d 22, 24 (1942)" 
11
 (1) Exercise of control over the details over the work, (2) 
payment of compensation, (3) power of appointment, (4) power 
of dismissal, and (5) for whose benefit the work was done." 
Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 267, 176 P.2d 118, 120-121 (1947). 
It should be noted that the foregoing four cases precede the 1975 amend-
ment. Such amendment was intended to even further limit the circumstances in 
which another subcontractor (Marathon) or prime contractor (Hensel-Phelps) could 
be found to be an enployer of an injured worker hired and controlled by a separate, 
independent subcontractor. Subsequent to said amendment this Court has ruled an 
employee-enployer relationship will not bar a suit unless the defendant had the 
right to control the work of the plaintiff at the time of the injury. There is 
nothing in the record herein to show any such right in Marathon and Hensel-Phelps. 
Plaintiff was hired, paid, directed, trained and controlled in her work by Placers. 
No other entity had a right to do so. Only two Placers employees were engaged in 
fusing re-bar in the fthole" when the fire occurred. This type of work was not 
the same as that being performed by defendants. 
It is considered even under the Peterson cases, supra, summary judgment 
here was improper. This result appears even more certain when it is rioted that 
neither Hensel-Phelps or Marathon had any right to pay, hire or fire plaintiff 
nor did they have any right to determine what work she would perform or the means, 
methods and details thereof. When this is evaluated in conjunction with the 
1975 amendment and the cases cited both before and after its enactment, the 
Summary Judgment granted herein should not be allowed to stand. 
SUMMARY 
It is respectfully submitted that plaintiff has demonstrated herein the 
existence of disputes concerning material facts and legal theories based thereon 
upon which a jury could find defendants negligent. These disputed facts are such 
that reasonable minds could well differ as to their meaning and inference. 
When all reasonable inferences as to all theories and facts advanced by 
plaintiff are viewed in her favor, it is considered the Sunmary Judgment of the 
Trial Court should be reversed. In this vein, too, plaintiff is entitled to have 
viewed in her favor all facts which may yet be adduced at trial or through further 
discovery. 
Further, plaintiff is entitled to proceed against Hensel-Phelps and Marathon 
at trial on the issue of negligence. The facts shown in the present record, or 
which may be brought forth subsequently when considered in her favor demonstrate 
she was not an employee of said firms at the time of her injuries. On such basis, 
Summary Judgment against her was improper. 
On the basis of the foregoing, the Trial Courtfs Sunmary Judgment dismissal 
as to Hensel-Phelps and Marathon should be reversed and the matter remanded for 
trial on the merits. 
DATED this // — day of April, 1985. 
BEESLEY, SPENCER & FAIRCLOUGH 
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